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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as : 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and'MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and : 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN : 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 
JALYNN NAY, the heirs of 
WAYNE NAY, : 
Plaintiffs, 
: Appeal No. 910244 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC : 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (i) . The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(3)(h). 
STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES 
3. Did the trial Court err in granting General Motors1 
Motion to Require the Appellant to Include Additional Transcripts 
in Record on Appeal? 
1 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, and no deference is given to 
the trial court's findings. State By and Through the Div. of 
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 
1990) ; Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Kelson v. Salt 
Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989); Pates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 
658 (Utah 1988); Scharf v. BMC Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (1985). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal 
that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or contrary to the evidence, the appellant 
shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such a finding or 
conclusion. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a products liability action concerning a 1986 GMC 
High Sierra truck which was involved in an accident on September 
20, 1986, killing Robert Nay and Wayne Nay. During trial, the 
appellants contended that the accident was caused when a stone 
became lodged in a "pinch-point" between the flexible coupling and 
the end retainer nut on the steering box. The appellants also 
contended that the "pinch-point" constitued a defect which was 
unreasonably dangerous to users of the vehicle. 
2 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
On May 31, 1991, the appellants filed their request for 
transcripts with the trial court reporter (See letter to Hal 
Walton, attached as Exhibit ffFfl) . The appellants requested the 
direct and redirect examination of each of their expert witnesses, 
Dr. Ben Bayse, Lindley Manning, and David Stephens. The appellants 
also requested the entire testimony of LeEarl Nay and Matthew Nay. 
On June 11, 1991, General Motors filed a Designation of 
Addition Parts of the Record to be Included in Transcript on Appeal 
(Attached as Exhibit flGff) . In this Designation, General Motors 
requested that the appellants include in the record on appeal the 
testimony from its expert witnesses as well as the cross 
examination of appellants1 expert witnesses. 
Through a letter dated June 13, 1991, the appellants 
informed General Motors that they would not request the additional 
transcripts because the testimony was not relevant to the appeal 
(See letter from Steve Morgan to H. James Clegg, attached as 
Exhibit ,fH!f.) On June 24, 1991, General Motors filed a motion to 
require the appellants to include the requested transcripts in the 
record on appeal (attached as Exhibit "I"). The appellants filed 
a memorandum in opposition to this motion on June 28, 1991 
(attached as Exhibit "J"). General Motors filed a reply memorandum 
on July 2, 1991 (attached as Exhibit lfK,f) . 
3 
Through a minute entry dated July 16, 1991, the trial 
court granted General Motors1 motion (attached as Exhibit "L"). An 
order to this effect was prepared by General Motors' counsel 
(attached as Exhibit "M") . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A full statement of the facts is contained in the 
appellants1 original brief. The facts relevant to this portion of 
the appeal are contained in the Course of the Proceedings above. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that the appellant shall provide the appellate court with 
all transcripts which are relevant to the appeal. The issue before 
this Court is whether the testimony sought by General Motors is 
relevant to this appeal. 
The appellants are contending before this Court that the 
directed verdict granted to General Motors by the trial court was 
erroneous. In reviewing this directed verdict, this Court applies 
the following standard: 
We must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgement in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained. 
4 
Management Comm. v. Grevstone Pines, 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986). 
Since the issue is whether the appellants introduced sufficient 
evidence to state a claim against General Motors, the appellants 
contend that the only evidence necessary to decide the appeal is 
that evidence introduced by the appellants. If that evidence 
states a claim against General Motors, the directed verdict must be 
reversed. If the evidence does not state a claim for relief, the 
verdict stands. There is simply no need to include evidence 
introduced by the respondent on appeal. 
The appellants assert that this case is controlled by 
Koer v. Mavfair Mkts. , 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). In 
Koer, this court found that in reviewing directed verdicts, all 
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
appellants and all evidence contradicting the appellants1 evidence 
must be discarded. Id. at 34 3, 431 P.2d at 569. There is no need 
to include the respondent's expert witness testimony because this 
Court must disregard it anyway. 
The appellants filed their brief with this Court long 
before the trial court ordered the additional transcripts included. 
In that brief, the appellants did not rely on any of General 
Motors1 expert witness testimony. This is primae facie evidence 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REQUIRING THE 
APPELLANTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD WITH 
GENERAL MOTORS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF APPELLANTS' EXPERTS. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness, and no deference is given to the trial court's 
findings. State By and Through the Div. of Consumer Protection v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); Doelle v. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989); Kelson v. Salt Lake County. 784 P.2d 
1152 (Utah 1989); Oates v. Chavez. 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988); Scharf 
v. BMC Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (1985). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
RECORD 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that "[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to such a finding or conclusion." U.R.App.P. 
11(e)(2). The issue before this Court is whether the additional 
transcripts requested by General Motors are relevant to the appeal, 
6 
and therefore must be provided in the record1. The appellants urge 
that these transcripts are not relevant and should not have been 
included. 
The appellants have asked this Court to reverse the 
directed verdict granted to General Motors by the trial court. 
This Court applies the following standard of review in addressing 
directed verdicts: 
We must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and if there is 
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgement in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be 
sustained. 
Management Comm. v. Greystone Pines, 652 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1986); See 
also Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P. 2d 112 (Utah 
1982); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980); Asay v. 
Rappleve, 593 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1979). Furthermore, the evidence must 
be such that reasonable men could not arrive different conclusions. 
Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973); Rhiness v. 
Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). Thus, reversal is 
1
 General Motors has requested the transcripts on their own 
accord. Therefore, the requested transcripts will be part of the 
record on appeal regardless of the outcome of this portion of the 
appeal. However, Rule 11(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires the appellant to pay for the relevant 
transcripts. Thus, while the issue has been framed as whether the 
additional transcripts are relevant to the appeal, the true issue 
is whether the appellants should be forced to pay for these 
transcripts. 
7 
appropriate if the appellants can establish sufficient evidence of 
each element of their claim against General Motors• Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988); Koer v. Mavfair Mkts. . 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). 
The appellants assert that this case is controlled by 
Koer v, Mavfair Mkts,, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967)- In 
Koer, this Court found that: 
In disposing of a post verdict motion as well 
as in directed verdicts, all of the testimony 
and all reasonable inferences flowing 
therefrom which tend the prove the plaintiff's 
case must be accepted as true, and all 
conflicts and all evidence which tends to 
disprove it must be disregarded. 
Koer, 19 Utah 2d at 342, 431 P.2d at 569 (citing Boskovich v, Utah 
Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953)). This is 
consistent with the general principle that all evidence on appeal 
must be viewed most favorably to the losing party. Management 
Comm. v. Grevstone Pines, 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986); Boskovich v, 
Utah Constr. Co.. 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953). 
Applying this standard to the subject case, the 
transcripts requested by General Motors are not relevant to this 
appeal. General Motors requested the cross examination of the 
appellants1 expert witnesses. The purpose of this cross examination 
was to discredit these witnesses. But Koer mandates that all 
conflicts be disregarded and the appellants1 evidence be accepted 
8 
as true. Therefore, there is no need to require the appellant to 
include in the record on appeal transcripts which will not, and 
cannot, be used by this court in reviewing the directed verdict. 
The trial court also required the appellants to include 
the testimony of General Motors expert witnesses. These witnesses 
each testified that the accident was not caused by stone 
interference, as the appellants asserted, but rather was caused by 
driver error. Each of the appellants1 expert witnesses testified 
that there was no driver error. Under Koer, this Court must accept 
as true the appellants1 expert witnesses testimony. There is 
simply no need for General Motors1 expert witness testimony because 
these witnesses testified contrary to the appellants1 experts and, 
under Koer, the appellants1 testimony must be accepted as 
true. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also specifically held that 
Utah appellate courts are not to weigh the evidence on appeal or 
determine facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Finlavson v. 
Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). Under Finlavson, the 
Court may not use General Motorsf expert witness testimony or its 
cross examination of appellants* expert witnesses to discredit the 
appellants1 explanation of the accident. Rather, the appellants1 
explanation of the cause of the accident must be accepted as true. 
9 
Finally, the appellants filed their brief with this Court 
before the testimony sought to be included by General Motors was 
transcribed by the trial court reporter. In their brief, the 
appellant neither cite to nor refer to the testimony sought by 
General Motors. The appellants were able to meet their burden of 
establishing evidence of each element of their claim against 
General Motors without the transcripts requested by General Motors. 
This is perhaps the best evidence of all that there is no need for 
the transcripts requested by General Motors. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The transcripts requested by General Motors should not be 
included in the record on appeal. Under Koer v. Mavfair Mkts., 19 
Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), all evidence offered by the 
appellants must be regarded as true, and any evidence that is 
contrary to the appellants1 evidence must be disregarded. General 
Motors wants to include their expert witness testimony and the 
cross examination of appellants1 expert witnesses for the sole 
purpose of discrediting the evidence offered by the appellants. 
This is impermissible under Koer. Furthermore, the transcripts 
requested by General Motors should be excluded because this court 
cannot use them in determining the cause of the accident. 
Finlavson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). 
10 
The appellants have filed their brief without reference 
to the requested transcripts. General Motors is capable of arguing 
the validity of the directed verdict without these transcripts. 
The trial court's order granting General Motors' Motion to Require 
Appellant to Include Additional Transcripts in the Record on Appeal 
should be reversed. 
Dated this / of August, 1991. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Attorney for Appell^ht 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *7 day of August, 1991, I 
caused a true and correct copy of SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT to be hand delivered to H. James Clegg, SNOW CHRISTENSEN 
& MARTINEAU, Attorney for Defendants/Respondents, 10 Exchange 
Place, Eleventh Floor. P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
I i 
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R A N D A L L D L U N D 
•A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
LAW O F F I C E S OF 
M O R G A N & H A N S E N 
k PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING * ^QOFESS IO N AC CORPORATION 
K E A R N S B U I L D I N G E I G H T H F L O O R 
136 S O U T H MAIN S T R E E " 
S A L T L A K E C!TV, U T A H 8 * 1 O I 
T E L E P H O N E S C O 5 3 1 - 7 8 8 8 
F A X . ( 3 0 I 531-9732 
May 3 1 , 1991 
OF COUNSEL 
M I C H A E L . w» C O O P E R 
WRITER 'S D I R E C " N U M B E R . ' 
Hal Walton 
Court Reporter 
Third Judicial District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Nav v. General Motors: C 88-6114 
Dear Hal: 
You are hereby requested to prepare, certify, and 
transmit to the clerk of the Third District Court the following 
transcripts for our appeal: 
1. The direct and redirect examination of C. Ben Bayse, 
Lyn Manning, and David C. Stephens. 
2. The entire testimony of Matthew Nay and Earl Nay. 
3. Transcript of the hearing on September 26, 1990 in 
which the Court considered defendants Motion in Limine. 
4. Transcript of the hearing conducted on April 5, 1991 
concerning the plaintiffsf Motion for New Trial and 
defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict. 
You are further requested to acknowledge receipt of this 
request and to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the date 
which you expect to file the transcript and of the date on which 
the transcript is filed. 
This letter serves as certification to the Court that I 
have made satisfactory arrangements with you for payment of the 
cost of the transcript. 
Sincerely yours, 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgarv 
cc: Clerk of the Third District Court 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
James Clegg 
TabG 
H. JAMES. CLEGG (A0681) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION and RON 
GREEN CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL 
PARTS OF RECORD TO BE INCLUDED 
IN TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
No. C-88-6114 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
(Supreme Court No. 910244) 
Pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, defendant/appellee General Motors Corporation designates 
the following additional portions of the transcript in this case 
to be transcribed and included in the record on appeal: 
1. All testimony of c. Ben Bayse, Lyn Manning, and 
David c. Stephens not heretofore designated by 
plaintiffs/appellants. 
2. The entire testimony of Chester Johnson. 
3. The entire testimony of Newell Knight. 
4. The entire testimony of Jerry Confer. 
5. The entire testimony of Pete Riede. 
Pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3), defendant requests that plain-
tiffs order said additional portions of the transcript from the 
court reporter. Defendant makes this request on the basis that 
the additional portions of the transcript bear upon the issues 
presented by the plaintiffs in their docketing statement and that 
Rule 11(e)(2) therefore requires plaintiffs to include the tran-
scripts of said evidence m the record. 
DATED this [!•>( day of June, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodney R.j Parker 
Attorneys for Defendant General 
Motors Corporation 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Nancy Hughes, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached DESIGNATION OF 
ADDITIONAL PARTS OF RECORD TO BE INCLUDED IN TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
(Case Number C88-6114, Salt Lake County District Court, state of 
Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Sa l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84101 
and causing the same t o be mailed f i r s t c l a s s , postage p repa id , 
on the 11th day of June, 1991. 
WrfljJ, rtu^TAO 
Nancy Hughe£ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 11th day of June, 
1991. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the s t a t e of Utah 
Mfy/Jio&fni&sion 'Exp i res : ' 
^ t o t - ' - r r ~ , > 
TabH 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN' 
DARWIN C. HANSEN 
DEN N!S R. JAMES 
JOHN C. HANSEN 
CHAS E H. PARKER 
RANDALL D. LUND 
•A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
LAW OFFICES OF 
M O R G A N & H A N S E N 
k PAPTNERSHIP INCLUDING A SROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
KEARNS BUILDING. EIGHTH FLOOR 
136 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH QA\0\ 
TELEPHONE ,3CI) 531-73 8 8 
FAX: . 'aon 531-9732 
OF COUNSEL 
MICHAEL J . COOPER 
WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER! 
June 13, 1991 
H. James Clegg 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Dear Jim: 
We have received your designation of additional 
transcripts which you wish included on appeal. Having reviewed 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to 
request any additional transcripts from the court. 
Under Rule 11(e) (2) , we need provide the appellate court 
with the evidence relevant to the issue being decided. If the 
appellate court finds evidence which would support a verdict for 
the plaintiff, the directed verdict must be overturned. The 
transcripts we have requested from the trial court provide ample 
evidence of General Motor!s negligence. 
Since the issue on appeal is whether there is any 
evidence to support plaintifffs position, we do not believe the 
transcripts you have requested would be helpful to the appellate 
court because they support General Motor's position. 
General Motors may, under Rule 11(e)(3), request the 
transcripts. However, we believe we have supplied the appellate 
court with the necessary transcripts to overturn the trial court's 
directed verdict. 
Sincerely, 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Tab I 
H. JAMES. CLEGG (A0681) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION and RON 
GREEN CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO 
INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF 
TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON APPEAL 
No. C-88-6114 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
(Supreme Court No. 910244) 
Pursuant to Rule 11(e)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, defendant/appellee General Motors Corporation moves the 
court to require appellant to include the following additional 
portions of the transcript in this case in the record on appeal: 
1. All testimony of C. Ben Bayse, Lyn Manning, and 
David C. Stephens not heretofore designated by 
plaintiffs/appellants. 
2. The entire testimony of Chester Johnson. 
3. The entire testimony of Newell Knight. 
4. The entire testimony of Jerry Confer. 
5. The entire testimony of Pete Riede. 
Defendant makes this motion on the basis that the additional 
portions of the transcript bear upon the issues presented by the 
plaintiffs in their docketing statement and that Rule 11(e)(2) 
therefore requires plaintiffs to include the transcripts of said 
evidence in the record. 
DATED this ty\ day of June, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By "&A^ 
Rodney R.i Parker 
Attorneys for Defendant General 
Motors Corporation 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Nancy Hughes, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached MOTION TO REQUIRE 
APPELLANT TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON 
APPEAL and accompanying MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
REQUIRE APPELLANT TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF TRANSCRIPT IN 
RECORD ON APPEAL (Case Number C88-6114, Salt Lake County District 
Court, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 24th day of June, 1991. 
/lamu 41LIDJIL^ 
Nancy Hughes ,j 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of June, 
1991. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
esiding in the State 8f Utah 
My Commission Expires 
H. JAMES. CLEGG (A0681) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION and RON 
GREEN CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO 
INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF 
TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON APPEAL 
No. C-88-6114 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
(Supreme Court No. 910244) 
Defendant General Motors Corporation submits this memorandum 
in support of its motion to require plaintiffs to include addi-
tional parts of the transcript in the record on appeal. For the 
court's reference, a copy of plaintiffs' transcript order is 
attached as Exhibit A, a copy of defendant's designation of addi-
tional part of the transcript is attached as Exhibit B, and a 
copy of plaintiffs1 response is attached as Exhibit C. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a find-
ing or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to 
the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding 
or conclusion. 
Plaintiffs1 docketing statement lists the following as an 
issue on appeal: 
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion 
for Directed Verdict on the issue of negligence in 
light of plaintiffs' weighty expert witness testimony? 
In ordering the transcripts of that "weighty" expert testi-
mony, plaintiffs ordered only the direct and redirect examination 
of those experts transcribed, and failed to order the transcripts 
of other "weighty" evidence which supported General Motors. The 
rule, however, requires a transcript of "all evidence relevant 
to" the court's conclusion on the issue, and clearly contemplates 
that cross-examination and other evidence will be transcribed. 
Plaintiffs assert in their letter response (Exhibit C) to 
defendant's designation that the issue on appeal is whether there 
is any evidence to support plaintiffs' position. They argue that 
they are therefore not required to designate portions of the 
transcript which would support General Motors' position. Plain-
tiffs misread the rule. It requires designation of all evidence 
"relevant to" the issue raised. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
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In testing the sufficiency of the evidence on motion 
for nonsuit, the evidence must be viewed as a whole, 
including the status of the evidence after cross-
examination. 
Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229, 233 (1947). Plain-
tiffs ask the appellate court to test the sufficiency of the 
evidence, and must include all of the evidence, including cross-
examination, in the record. 
Defendant has also designated for transcription the testi-
mony of Chester Johnson, Newell Knight, Jerry Confer, and Pete 
Riede. These individuals all gave expert testimony relevant to 
the cause of the accident, which is clearly relevant to the issue 
plaintiffs raise. Under Rule 11(e)(2), plaintiffs are required 
to order and pay for transcripts of their testimony as well. 
DATED this jHjJ^ay of June, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Rodnet R.^Parker 




Stephen G. Morgan, #2315 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Atrorneys for Plaintiffs 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (301) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 




GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs submit the following Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant General Motors' Motion to Require Appellant to Include 
Additional Parts of the Transcript in Record on Appeal. 
In ruling on a Motion to Supplement the Record, this 
Court should consider "the necessity of the supplemental material, 
prior opportunities to introduce the supplemental material and the 
length of the resulting delay." Jeschke v. Willis, 793 P. 2d 428 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT GENERAL 
MOTORS MOTION TO REQUIRE 
APPELLANT TO INCLUDE 
ADDITIONAL PARTS OF 
TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
Civil No. C 88-6114 
(Utah App. 1990) . Defendant General Motors has requested that the 
Plaintiffs provide the appellate court with Defendant's expert 
witness testimony and the cross examination of Plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses- Plaintiffs contend the transcripts requested by General 
Motors are neither necessary nor relevant to the appeal. 
The basis for this Court's granting of Defendants' Motion 
for Directed Verdict was that Plaintiffs "didn't prove your case", 
and that the Court "didn't think that the steering interference 
claim was a valid claim." Thus, the "finding" in issue for Rule 
11(e) (2) purposes was that the Plaintiffs failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to prove that General Motors negligently 
designed the vehicle. 
When reviewing a directed verdict based on the plaintiffs 
failure to provide sufficient evidence to state a claim, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held reversal is appropriate if, viewing the 
evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, it concludes there is any 
substantial evidence to support a verdict in their favor. Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P. 2d 14 (Utah 1988) ; Koer v. Mavfair Mkts. , 19 Utah 2d 
339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967). 
Under this standard, the only evidence "relevant" for 
Rule 11 purposes to the trial court's finding is the evidence 
introduced by the Plaintiffs to support their claim. If there is 
sufficient evidence to establish the Plaintiffs' claim, the 
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directed verdict will be reversed. If not, the directed verdict 
will be sustained. There is simply no need to include in the 
appellate record evidence produced by the Defendants at trial. 
Furthermore, the Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict 
was made at the close of Plaintiff's case. The Court subsequently 
granted the Motion. Thus, whether or not the Court should have 
granted Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict will depend upon 
the evidence before the Court at that time, which was the testimony 
presented by the Plaintiffs, not the subsequent testimony presented 
by the Defendant. 
A. EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Defendant General Motors has requested that testimony 
from its expert witnesses be included in the appellate transcripts. 
In light of the above discussion, this request should be denied 
because this evidence was introduced by the Defendant, and was 
introduced after the close of Plaintiffs! case and after Defendant 
had made its Motion for Directed Verdict. The evidence introduced 
by the Defendant has no bearing on whether Plaintiff was able to 
state a prima facie case for relief against General Motors at the 
close of Plaintiffs' case. 
Furthermore, evidence presented by the Defendants can not 
be used by the appellate court in ruling on the Motion for Directed 
Verdict. The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that courts 
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deciding or reviewing directed verdicts are nor to weigh the 
evidence or determine issues by a preponderance of the evidence, 
Finlavson v. Bradv, 121 Utah 204, 240 P.2d 491 (1952). The 
appellate court will be prohibited from taking into account 
Defendant General Motors1 expert witness testimony since it was not 
presented by Plaintiffs to support their claim. Thus, the evidence 
presented by the Defendant is not relevant to the appeal since it 
can not be used by the appellate court even if included in the 
trial transcript. 
Simply stated, Defendant General Motors expert witness 
testimony is net relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiffs have 
established a prima facie case of negligence against General 
Motors, and therefore the request for transcripts should be denied. 
B. CROSS EXAMINATION OF BAYSE, MANNING, AND STEPHENS 
Defendant General Motors also requests that the cross 
examination testimony of Plaintiff!s expert witnesses be included 
in the appellate transcripts. For reasons similar to those set 
forth above, this request should also be denied because it is not 
relevant. 
As presented above, the only evidence which is relevant 
to the appellate review of a directed verdict is that evidence 
presented by the Plaintiffs. Cross examination is not evidence 
presented by the Plaintiff, and therefore should be excluded. 
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Cross examination is used primarily to attack the credibility of 
Plaintiffs' expert witnesses, and any testimony introduced during 
cross examination was elicited by General Motors1 attorney. Such 
testimony thus constitutes part of the defense presentation and has 
no bearing on whether Plaintiffs have stated a prima facie claim 
for relief. 
Cross examination testimony is also not relevant to the 
appellate court review because the court must view all evidence in 
the light most favorable to the losing party, or in this case, 
Plaintiffs. Management Comm. v. Grevstone Pines, 652 P. 2d 896 
(Utah 1982); Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 
885 (1953) . Thus, any inconsistencies in the expert witness 
testimony must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, 
cross examination testimony is not "relevant" to the appeal. 
C. REASONABLE MINDS CAN DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
In order to grant a directed verdict, the Court must 
conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the party being moved against, that reasonable minds could not 
differ that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove a case of negligence 
against Defendant General Motors. Management Comm. v. Grevstone 
Pines, Inc. , 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Gribble, 30 Utah 
2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973) . 
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The fact that this case was submitted to the jury and 
four members of the eight person jury found that Plaintiffs had 
proved a case of negligence against General Motors argues against 
any conclusion that reasonable minds could not differ. The fact 
is, based on the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs, reasonable 
minds did differ and based thereon, the Court should not have 
granted Defendant General Motors' Motion for Directed Verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have provided all "relevant" information to 
the appellate court. They have provided the testimony from the 
three expert witnesses Plaintiffs used to support their claim for 
negligence, as well as the testimony from the only eye witnesses to 
the accident, Matthew Nay and LeEarl Nay. Plaintiffs therefore 
have fully complied with Rule 11(e)(2). 
The transcripts Defendant General Motors has requested 
have no bearing on whether Plaintiff established a prima facie case 
of negligence against General Motors. Therefore, Defendant's 
Motion should be denied. 
Defendant General Motors, in making its Motion to Require 
Appellant to Include Additional Parts of Transcript in the Record 
on Appeal, is simply attempting to force the Plaintiffs to add 
parts of the transcript that are not relevant to Plaintiffs1 
appeal. In addition, General Motors seeks to require Plaintiffs, 
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who are far less able to afford the cost of this litigation than 
General Motors, to pay for such additional parts and thus hopefully 
discourage Plaintiffs from pursuing this appeal. 
Thus, assuming arguendo, that the Court allows Defendant 
General Motors to include in the appellate record transcripts of 
the cross examination of Plaintiff!s expert witnesses as well as 
the testimony of Defendant's expert witnesses, which Plaintiff 
vigorously resists for the reasons stated above, the Court should 
require that Defendant General Motors pay for the costs of such 
transcripts instead of the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this £$ day of June, 1991, 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS 
MOTION TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF 
TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON APPEAL to be mailed, first class, on the 
**$ day of June, 1991, H. James Clegg, Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, Attorneys for Defendants, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh 
Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City,/:UT 84145. 
U 
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TIIE COURT: Well, I understand and I want some! 
clear with you two learned Gentlemen. 1 really feel that 
you're right on your motion, that we should have had a three-
quarter decision one way or the other in tnat case. I made a 
mistake in allowing them not to be hung. But to enter in a 
verdict which in effect was a clear indication that you had 
not carried your burden, but by the same token I don't think 
it was an indication thar the Jury had a right to enter that 
verdict:. So I think that is clearly correct under the circur 
-stances here. But on the other hand, I frankly, honestly 
feel that had the Jury come in with a verdict at that time :: 
would have granted a Directed Verdict or Judgement NOV, 
because I frankly, feel, again, it just may be my understand! 
of the evidence, that it-probably I view it differently than 
of course the plaintiffs do. But I just didnft think that th 
teering interference claim was a valid claim;and so I would 
t this point, grant that motion, because I think That's the 
way that case should have come out legally and under the 
fact*.-. So now, f guess we're at the point where nobody is ha* 
oy. 
fiu, ,,iCKGr--ii: Uo. Let me just say for the recorf 
plaintiffs respectfully disagree with you, but would you like 
Mr. Clegg to prepare the Order? 
THE COURT: No, I am going to let you prepare it. 
MR. MORGAN: Want me to prepare it? I'll prepare 
it. 
come in with a verdict by a 2/3rds vote one way 
or the other. Now, I am concerned 
MR. MORGAN: Three/fourths . 
THE COURT: Or 3/4ths, excuse me, I misstated my-
-self. On the other hand, my view of the evidence at the 
time of the trial, and I again respectfully disagree with the 
plaintiff in this case, is that you didn't prove your case, 
I frankly don't think there was a cause of action in 
that law suit. So, what I am going to do, and then you both 
will have some couuuon appeal, is I am going to set the verclic 
aside and grant you a new trial;then I am going to grant Mr. 
Clegg's Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
MR. MORGAN: That being the case, I take it that 
the costs that were assessed on the judgment are a nullity at 
this point? 
THE COURT: Well, I am not going to rule on that, 
because I am not sure what the law is, but I think you may be 
right. But I think that wasn't before the Court here and tha 
may be the ultimate result. 
I suppose if we go up on appeal and they reverse me, 
and sent the thing back down for trial, that those asts on 
that first trial would be added to the costs of the second 
trial, whichever way the thing comes out, if the Court in it' 
discretion so decided. 
MR. CLKGG: I would make no move to collect on 
those without giving the Court and counsel adequate notice. 
TabK 
H. JAMES. CLEGG (A0681) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION and RON 
GREEN CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' opposition to General Motors' motion is based 
upon inapplicable legal authority and upon an incorrect factual 
analysis. 
Plaintiffs begin their analysis with a quote from Jeschke v. 
Willis, 793 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1990). That case involved a 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP 
MOTION TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO 
INCLUDE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF 
TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON APPEAL 
No. C-88-6114 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
(Supreme Court No. 910244) 
motion to supplement the record. That is not the issue presented 
here. Here, the designated materials will be included in the 
record regardless of the court's ruling. The issue before this 
court is who will pay for the transcript. 
Plaintiffs misstate the standard the appellate court will 
apply in reviewing the directed verdict in this case. They say 
the standard is whether, looking only at evidence elicited by the 
plaintiffs1 attorney, and disregarding everything else, any 
evidence at all exists that might have supported a verdict for 
plaintiffs. That standard is nice and simple, but it is wrong. 
The Supreme Court stated the correct standard in Management 
Committee of Gravstone Pines Homeowners Association v. Gravstone 
Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982), as follows: 
This Court's standard of review of a directed ver-
dict is the same as that imposed upon the trial court. 
We must examine the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable 
basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the 
losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
652 P.2d at 898. 
The difference between this standard and the standard as 
stated by plaintiffs is that the standard set forth in Graystone 
allows the court to consider all of the evidence, not just the 
evidence elicited by plaintiffs1 lawyer. That is why a motion 
for directed verdict must be renewed at the close of all the 
evidence. 
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This is illustrated by an example from the trial of this 
case. Mr. Manning testified, in direct examination by plain-
tiffs1 counsel, to a scenario in which a rock could be lofted up 
from the road, pass from the wheel well to the engine compart-
ment, and lodge in the steering. He based this opinion on 
studies of 1983 or 1984 model year pickup trucks in a St. Louis 
case. However, in the cross-examination of Mr. Bayse. another of 
plaintiffs1 experts, it was brought out that the model of truck 
which plaintiffs1 decedent was driving had a fiberboard dust 
shield between the wheel well and the engine compartment, which 
prevents the scenario which Mr. Manning speculated could occur. 
Plaintiffs want the appellate court to consider Mr. Man-
ning's testimony without the benefit of the undisputed facts 
brought out in the cross-examination of Mr. Bayse, which make 
Mr. Manning's hypothesis totally impossible. They cannot do 
that. That is the reason the Gravstone case speaks in terms of 
the evidence, not just plaintiffs' direct evidence. It is also 
the reason the Supreme Court held in Oberg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 
507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947), that "the evidence must be viewed as a 
whole, including the status of the evidence after cross-
examination. " 
Plaintiffs chose to raise these issues on appeal. The rules 
require them, not the defendant, to provide the appellate court 
with all evidence bearing upon the factual conclusions which they 
challenge. 
-3-
DATED this 2*X. day of July, 1991. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By *^-
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Nancy Hughes, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REQUIRE APPELLANT TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL 
PARTS OF TRANSCRIPT IN RECORD ON APPEAL (Case Number C88-6114, 
Salt Lake County District Court, State of Utah) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 2nd day of July, 1991. 
icy ^ ughe^/ £j Nanc
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of July, 
1991. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
M^^Ajp^sfeioECa?xpj.res^ur5r. 
„.,, ^_^x - — _rss 
—- ^ n ^,_ }?j^1- ~-r LTTAH 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and as 
personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually 
and as personal representative 
for CONNIE WHEELER", CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and 




GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GMC 
TRUCK DIVISION AND RON GREEN 
CHEVROLET PONTIAC GMC, INC., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 880906114 PI 
The Court having considered the Motion to Require 
Appellant to Include Additional Parts of the Transcript in the 
Record on Appeal, the Memorandum and the Reply Memorandum in 
Support thereof and the Memorandum in Opposition thereto and now 
being fully advised in the premises makes its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Said Motion is granted. The Court is of the opinion that 
the rule requires that all relevant testimony relating to an 
issue raised by the Notice of Appeal must be included within the 
NAY V GENERAL MOTORS PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
the transcript. All relevant testimony includes testimony that 
is not only direct but cross-examination. It further includes 
testimony in opposition to the testimony raised by any one 
party. For these reasons, inter alia, and those set forth in 
defendants' memorandum and reply memorandum in support of it's 
motion, said motion is granted. 
Counsel for the defendants will prepare an appropriate 
order. /N^ 
_ day of July^^ts; DATED this 
RTCE^RO HJ MOFFAT 
DISTRICT /COUffl// JUDGE 
NAY V GENERAL MOTORS PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this \~1 *~ day of July, 1991: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 South Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
H. James Clegg 
Rodney R. Parker 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Defendants 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
TabM 
H. JAMES. CLEGG (A0681) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN Se MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
General Motors Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office BOX 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEEANN NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
MATTHEW and MERISSA NAY, the 
heirs of ROBERT NAY; and 
VIRGINIA NAY, individually and 
as personal representative for 
CONNIE WHEELER, CAROLYN 
GALLEGHER, JOAN NAY and JALYNN 
NAY, the heirs of WAYNE NAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
GMC TRUCK DIVISION and RON 





Judge Richard H. Moffat 
(Supreme Court No. 910244) 
The court has considered defendant General Motors Corpora-
tion' s Motion to Require Appellant to Include Additional Parts of 
the Transcript m the Record on Appeal. Pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
the motion was submitted to the court without oral argument. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Stephen G. Morgan 
of Morgan & Hansen. Defendant was represented by its counsel, 
Rodney R. Parker of Snow, Christensen & Martmeau. The court 
being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
ORDERS that the motion should be, and hereby is, granted. 
Plaintiff is ordered to include the following additional portions 
of the transcript in this case m the record on appeal: 
1. All testimony of c. Ben Bayse, Lyn Manning, and David C. 
Stephens not heretofore designated by plaintiffs/appellants. 
2. The entire testimony of Chester Johnson. 
3. The entire testimony of Newell Knight. 
4. The entire testimony of Jerry Confer. 
5. The entire testimony of Pete Riede. 
DATED this day of July, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Richard H. Moffat 
District Court Judge 
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